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The impressive success of peer production – a large-scale collaborative model of production 
primarily based on voluntary contributions – is difficult to explain through the assumptions 
of standard economic theory. The aim of this paper is to study the prosocial foundations of 
cooperation in this new peer production economy. We provide the first field test of existing 
economic theories of prosocial motives for contributing to real-world public goods. We use 
an online experiment coupled with observational data to elicit social preferences within a 
diverse sample of 850 Wikipedia contributors, and seek to use to those measures to predict 
subjects’ field contributions to the Wikipedia project. We find that subjects’ field 
contributions to Wikipedia are strongly related to their level of reciprocity in a conditional 
Public Goods game and in a Trust game and to their revealed preference for social image 
within the Wikipedia community, but not to their level of altruism either in a standard or in 
a directed Dictator game. Our results have important theoretical and practical implications, 
as we show that reciprocity and social image are both strong motives for sustaining 
cooperation in peer production environments, while altruism is not.   
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“The problem with Wikipedia is that it only works in practice. In theory, it can never work.” 
Kizor, Wikipedia administrator.1  
 
 
1    Introduction 
 
Peer production is characterized by the development of large-scale, collaborative and primarily 
voluntary models of production in some of the most innovative and competitive sectors of information 
and technology (Benkler 2002, 2006). One flagship of this “New Economy” is the impressive growth of 
Internet-based voluntary cooperation for the provision of public goods. Over the past 15 years, online 
communities of volunteers have proven successful at developing and freely releasing highly valued 
pieces of computer software and information goods which increasingly compete with their firm-based 
counterparts.2 Accordingly, some authors have argued that online peer production is emerging as a 
novel and sustainable production model (see, e.g., Benkler (2013) for a review). Its distinctive feature 
would be that it primarily relies on intrinsic motives to incentivize work, as individuals voluntarily self-
assign tasks in the absence of price signals and hierarchical authority. Focusing on the seminal case of 
open-source software, however, Lerner & Tirole (2002) point out that a sizeable fraction of developers 
derive some immediate or future monetary benefits from their seemingly “free” contributions, so that 
much of the dynamics of these projects could in fact be explained through the lens of the standard 
assumptions of economic theory.  
This paper speaks to this debate by studying the prosocial foundations of cooperation in Wikipedia, 
a peer production economy that has been vastly overlooked in the economics literature so far.3 We elicit 
the social preferences of Wikipedia contributors with an online experiment coupled with observational 
data, and seek to relate those preferences to subjects’ field contributions to the Wikipedia project. As 
opposed to open-source software, this highly successful peer-production community offers a 
particularly clean study site, as it is difficult to derive monetary rewards from one’s contributions to the 
project. Besides, it is possible to reliably extract from the Wikipedia website the complete record of 
editors’ contributions to this real-world public good. This allows us to separate out extrinsic from 
intrinsic motivations to contribute, and study purely the prosocial motivations aspect of peer 
production, relying on experimental and observational data rather than self-reporting.  
Since its inception in 2001, Wikipedia has grown to host over 25 million freely usable articles in 285 
languages. Its revealed informational value seems to be enormous to society, as it receives over 80 
million unique visitors per month in the United States alone,4 and that 60% of European doctors declare 
using it for professional purposes.5 Every potential Wikipedia contributor, however, faces a simple 
                                                 
1 See http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/technology/23link.html?ei=5124&en=435e5b69b6b3ceac&ex=13&_r=0, accessed 
February 2013.  
2 To name a few telling examples, the open-source web browser Mozilla Firefox is currently used by 25% of all Internet users, 
the open-source web server Apache serves 63% of all Internet websites, Wikipedia.org is the 5th most visited website on the 
Internet and the user-generated game Counter-Strike is one of the most popular and long-lasting video games of a 25 billion 
dollars industry in the U.S. alone.  
3 One notable exception for our purpose is Zhang & Zhu (2011).  
4 See 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/9/comScore_Media_Metrix_Ranks_Top_50_US_Web_Properties_for_A






public goods dilemma: while it takes time and effort to contribute valuable content to the encyclopedia, 
the content contributed by others is immediately available for anyone to see and use at no cost. 
According to the standard rational actor model, this should lead to no contributions being made in the 
first place.  
Individuals’ intrinsic motivations for contributing to a public good can be manifold. In this paper, 
we focus on the three types of social motives that economic theory has put forward to rationalize 
people’s often observed willingness to sustain cooperation in real-world public goods like 
environments: (i) altruistic motives, either in the form of “pure altruism” or “warm-glow” (Andreoni 
1989; Andreoni 1990; Anderson et al. 1998) (ii) reciprocity motives (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk & Fischbacher 2006) and (iii) social image motives (Holländer 1990; Bénabou & 
Tirole 2006; Andreoni & Bernheim 2009; Ellingsen & Johannesson 2008, 2011).  
This paper is the first to test for the relative role of each class of social motive for incentivizing 
sustained contributions to real-world public goods.6 Because Wikipedia in itself works as a repeated 
public goods experiment, we think of it as an ideally suited field for testing the external validity of those 
theories. On the methodology side, this paper illustrates the potential usefulness of coupling 
experimental methods with computational social science techniques in order to relieve the tension 
between internal and external validity in economic experiments. Indeed, while it is possible to leverage 
large samples and achieve high internal validity with online experiments (Hergueux & Jacquemet 2013) 
the Internet also provides a wealth of externally valid observational data on individuals’ field behavior 
(Lazer et al. 2009).  
Based on a diverse sample of 850 Wikipedia contributors, we find that measures of reciprocity and 
social image motives – but not altruism – significantly predict the trajectory of Wikipedia users from a 
non-contributor to a substantially engaged contributor. Our field experiment thus shows that 
reciprocity and social image are both strong motives for sustaining cooperation in peer-production 
environments, while altruism is not. In this process, reciprocity and social image appear as substitutable 
motivational drivers rather than complementary ones. Because social image motives are difficult to 
measure experimentally, we exploit the observational data that is available from the Wikipedia website 
to construct measures of revealed preference for social image within the Wikipedia community. 
Controlling for a vector of demographic variables, our estimates indicate that moving from no 
reciprocity to full reciprocity in a conditional Public Goods game and in a Trust game is associated with 
a 122% and a 211% increase in the number of Wikipedia contributions, respectively, while revealing a 
preference for social image is associated with a fivefold increase in the number of contributions made to 
the project.  
 Interestingly, however, our measures of taste for reciprocity do not predict anymore the number of 
contributions made to the project within the sub-group of super contributors to Wikipedia – who 
typically exhibit more than 2,000 and up to several hundreds of thousands of Wikipedia contributions – 
while a taste for social image continues to do so, although by a significantly smaller order of magnitude. 
                                                 
6 An extensive literature has investigated the role of those three classes of social motives in people’s (lack of) willingness to 
sustain cooperation in repeated public goods games in the lab, with unequal success. There is some evidence supporting the 
altruistic motive, although its effect appears to be inconsistent and not quantitatively large (Andreoni 1995; Palfrey & Prisbrey 
1997; Goeree et al. 2002; Andreoni & Miller 2002; Vesterlund et al. 2009). By contrast, lab experiments have provided strong 
evidence in support of the reciprocity motive (Burlando & Guala 2005; Gächter & Thöni 2005; Page et al. 2005; Cinyabuguma et 
al. 2005; Charness & Yang 2007; Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007; de Oliveira et al. 2009b; Fischbacher & Gächter 2010). The social 
image motive is also supported by rather strong experimental evidence (Andreoni & Petrie 2004; Rege & Telle 2004; Ariely et 
al. 2009) and its role has recently been confirmed in careful field experiments (Andreoni et al. 2011; DellaVigna et al. 2012).   
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Within this highly engaged group, revealing a taste for social image is associated with a 30 to 33% 
increase in the number of contributions made to the project.  
Finally, we study the contribution patterns of Wikipedia administrators, a particular class of highly 
engaged Wikipedia contributors who opted-in a very competitive peer-review process at the end of 
which they were granted with special oversight rights over the encyclopedia in order to perform an 
important policing role. Within this third group, we find that those who participate relatively more 
generally exhibit a higher taste for social image, but also a lower taste for reciprocity (and, incidentally, 
trust, as measured by the Trust game). Again, experimental measures of altruism do not seem to predict 
contributions patterns within this or any other group.   
This paper is related to a burgeoning stream of the literature that has begun to explore the predictive 
power of experimental measures of social motives on field outcomes. In his seminal work, Karlan (2005) 
uses the Trust game to obtain individual measures of reciprocity and shows that those can be used to 
predict loan repayment among participants in a microcredit program. Laury and Taylor (2008) and De 
Oliveira et al. (2009a) relate the propensity of their subjects to cooperate in a Public Goods game in the 
lab to their propensity to contribute to a charitable cause in the field. One prominent limitation of those 
studies, however, is that they both obtain information about “field” behavior in the lab itself, either 
through highly contextualized experiments or self-reports. In this case, one might worry about possible 
spurious correlations caused by demand effects and/or subjects’ willingness to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. Benz and Meier (2008) address part of the above concern by collecting field data about their 
subjects’ behavior in a charitable giving situation prior to conducting a charitable giving experiment in 
the classroom, but the experiments on which they rely to elicit preferences remain highly 
contextualized. Barr and Serneels (2009) conduct a Trust game among Ghanaian workers and establish a 
relationship between individual measures of reciprocity and the observed aggregate labor productivity 
of the firm in which they work. Similarly, Carpenter and Seki (2011) conduct a repeated Public Goods 
game among Japanese fishermen and show that fishing crews that exhibit higher levels of reciprocity 
are more productive. Perhaps most similar to the present study, Carpenter and Myers (2010) rely on an 
experimental measure of altruism (from a standard Dictator game) and an observational measure of 
social image concerns within a population of volunteer firefighters and non-volunteer community 
members to show that both preferences predict the decision to join the volunteer fire service. Finally, 
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) and Leibbrandt (2012) conduct a Public Goods game among Brazilian 
shrimp catchers and sellers, respectively, and show that more prosocial shrimp catchers are less likely 
to engage in overextraction, while more prosocial shrimp sellers achieve higher prices for the same 
goods. While both studies convincingly establish that levels of cooperation in a standard Public Goods 
experiment can predict field cooperation and economic outcomes, they are not designed, however, to 
answer the question of which specific preferences account for those general cooperative dispositions.  
The present study distinguishes itself from the above literature by eliciting and examining the 
relative predictive power of all three classes of prosocial motives in a comprehensive fashion. It is also 
the first to concurrently (i) follow the experimental economics standard of relying on highly 
decontextualized experiments to elicit individual preferences (ii) link those preferences to individual 
outcomes that were independently collected from the field and (iii) examine a real-world public goods 
like environment in which extrinsic motives play no role in shaping individual behavior.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some knowledge background on the 
Wikipedia project and its community of contributors. Section 3 documents the design and 
implementation of the study. We report the empirical results in section 4. Section 5 provides a 





2    Background on Wikipedia  
 
Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that is collaboratively edited by volunteers over the Internet. 
The Wikipedia project originates in Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger’s attempt at creating a traditional, 
extensively peer-reviewed online encyclopedia called “Nupedia” in March 2000. The goal of Nupedia 
was to get scholars and experts to volunteer their work and expertise to the project, with the goal of 
creating a free equivalent of the existing for-profit encyclopedias. Confronted with the difficulty of 
taking the project off the ground – Nupedia only got 21 articles finalized in its first year – Wales and 
Sanger eventually released Nupedia’s content over the Internet in January 2001 as an open side project, 
called “Wikipedia”, whose original purpose was to feed Nupedia with additional draft articles. 
Wikipedia quickly overtook Nupedia and became a multiple language popular project of its own, with 
over 20,000 encyclopedia articles created in its first year and an exponential growth of its content and 
contributor base since then.  
Since 2003, Wikipedia has been operated by the Wikimedia Foundation, a small San Francisco-based 
non-profit organization, whose role is to pay the bandwidth bills, buy the servers and provide legal 
defense for the project. The Wikimedia Foundation mostly leverages the capital that it needs to perform 
this function through donations. It is important to note that while the Foundation is interested in 
developing technical and social solutions that could support volunteers’ editing work, it has never been 
directly involved in developing Wikipedia’s content or managing its community of contributors. This is 
a matter of principle, and the relationships between the Wikimedia Foundation and the body of 
engaged Wikipedia contributors have sometimes been notably tense, as some would repeatedly suspect 
the Foundation of covertly trying to influence the evolution of the project and direct its development.  
On the technological side, Wikipedia is based on the wiki system, which allows the reader of any 
Wikipedia page to modify it easily and rapidly by clicking on an “edit” button. As a result, there exist 
no limitations à priori as to whom can contribute content to the encyclopedia. Many regular contributors 
choose to create a Wikipedia account in the website, notably because it gives them access to very useful 
editing tools. One prominent example of such tools is the so-called “watchlist”, which allows registered 
users to mark pages of interests and closely follow their evolution through automatic notices whenever 
a modification is implemented to them by another editor. The wiki system archives each and every 
version of a given page in a revision history, together with the username of the registered contributor 
who authored the revision. This feature allows the reader of any page to get a very quick sense of the 
modifications recently implemented to it and, if necessary, easily revert it to one of its previous state. It 
is not necessary, however, to create a Wikipedia account in order to contribute content to the 
encyclopedia, as this can be done “anonymously” in the exact same way. In this case, each modification 
implemented is registered together with the IP address of the computer from which it was performed.  
If they create a Wikipedia account, contributors automatically get a personal user page and a user 
talk page on the Wikipedia website. Those pages, like virtually every other on Wikipedia, can be edited 
by anyone. User pages are mostly edited by their owners to post some general information about 
themselves, their interest in Wikipedia, the articles they helped improve and the like. As collaborations 
between editors mostly form when they notice that they contribute to the same articles, either through 
its revision history or the watchlist system (as opposed to randomly scrawling contributors’ personal 
user pages in search for an editor with matching interests), those pages are not crucial to the functioning 
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of Wikipedia. Hence, a significant number of contributors choose to leave them blank. User talk pages, 
by contrast, are mainly edited by one’s fellow editors. They play a very critical role on Wikipedia, as 
they are used as a convenient place for contributors to communicate with one another, request help, ask 
questions and coordinate work. Taken together, those technical features explain that even if many 
individuals do contribute to Wikipedia without having registered an account, the contributions made in 
this fashion are more likely to be one-offs and, in any case, cannot be much collaborative in terms of 
content.  
The number of contributions made to Wikipedia by registered users follows a strong power law 
distribution. As of 2011, about 200,000 individuals register an account on Wikipedia each month.  
About 2% of those individuals make 10 contributions or more within their first month, which certainly 
represents a non negligible influx of new contributors per month in absolute terms. However, only 10% 
of those early contributors still make one contribution or more within the following year.7 As a result, 
the relatively limited body of editors who eventually become engaged and reach the threshold of 100 
Wikipedia contributions was still responsible for almost 70% of all the contributions made in 2007 
(Kittur et al. 2007). Even within the group of editors who become engaged with the project, individual 
contribution patterns are still highly heterogeneous. While the vast majority of engaged editors have a 
few hundred contributions in total, about 5,000 of them made more than 10,000 contributions and 
about 200 editors have contribution records ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000 contributions. Overall, 
the size of the body of active experienced contributors who reached the threshold of 300 contributions 
is relatively stable since 2007, revolving around 20,000 individuals.  
One surprising fact about Wikipedia is the ability of its community of engaged contributors to 
successfully synthesize into coherent and structured articles their often competing or opposed views 
about the topics at hand in a civil way. In this respect, it is interesting to note that among subjective 
topics, more controversial ones are on average better treated in Wikipedia, precisely because they attract 
attention from a larger and more diverse pool of contributors (Greenstein & Zhu 2012). Reagle (2010) 
provides a very detailed account of how relationships within the community of engaged editors are 
generally driven by common behavioral norms that emerged through progressive consensus building 
as it faced collective action problems. One paradigmatic example of such a norm is the “neutral point of 
view” policy. It is remarkable that this policy doesn’t state that editors should strive to be “neutral” or 
“objective” while contributing to a given article, but that a “fair” representation of all sides of the 
dispute should be sought. Conditional on being able to support one’s point with reliable secondary 
sources, this guiding principle has the positive effect of shifting many debates from the question of 
whether it should be included in the article to the question of how it should be included. Another 
example is the “assume good faith” principle, which exhorts editors to approach others’ contributions 
as being made in good faith and trying to help the project, unless there is specific evidence of malice. 
When direct discussion fails to resolve disputes among contributors, this is usually achieved by 
extending the debate to a larger audience, or seeking the mediation of a third party. 
Besides the sheer number of contributions that they make to Wikipedia, the body of engaged 
contributors is thus key to the project, as they often make contributions across topical boundaries in 
order to curate the content and turn it into a comprehensive resource, help newcomers learn the 
behavioral norms and attitudes that will allow them to connect with others and make valuable 
contributions to the project and informally mediate disputes. In this sense, engaged Wikipedia 
                                                 
7 See http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/TablesWikipediaEN.htm and 
http://strategy.wikimedia.org/wiki/Editor_Trends_Study/Results, accessed February 2013.  
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contributors create the public good value of the encyclopedia, and distinguish its contributor base from 
a broad collection of individuals trying to push their own personal agendas within the site.  
One particular class of engaged contributors, the Wikipedia administrators, are in charge of dealing 
with disruptive editors when good faith discussion and basic explanations about what the goal of the 
project is fail. To do so, they are entitled with special oversight rights over the encyclopedia that allows 
them to enforce the behavioral norms of the community, notably by blocking malicious editors and 
protecting vandalized pages. To obtain those policing rights, those engaged contributors decided to 
participate in a very competitive peer-review process that would require them to prove through their 
contribution history that they can handle heated debates and make difficult decisions.  
 
 
3    Design of the study 
 
In this section, we first describe our strategy for measuring social motives among our subjects. We then 




3. 1    Measuring social preferences 
 
We elicit social motives among our subjects using experimental data from five mostly standard 
decision problems taken from the literature on social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr & Camerer 2004) 
coupled with observational evidence. We systematically provide two different measures for each social 
motive, so that we can check for the consistency of our results. At the beginning of the experiment, 
subjects are sequentially attributed a role (according to their login order): either participant A or 
participant B. The assigned role remains the same during the whole experiment. At the end of the 
experiment, we ask subjects some standard demographic questions about their age, gender, education 
and salary level, along with an experimentally validated question on risk aversion taken from Dohmen 
et al. (2011).   
 
(i) Cooperation. As we are interested in studying the prosocial foundations of cooperation in 
Wikipedia, we start by eliciting our subjects’ propensity to cooperate in a very standard Public Goods 
dilemma (see figure 1 which pictures the Public Goods game instructions screen). Subjects play in 
groups of four with an initial endowment of $10 per player. Each euro invested in the common project 
by a member of the group yields a return of 0.4 euro to each group member.8 Subjects have to decide on 
how much of their $10 they want to invest in the common project. We take the proportion of the 
endowment that is unconditionally contributed to the public good as a measure of subjects’ propensity to 
cooperate when confronted with a social dilemma.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
8 Each subject thus faces the following payoff function: pii =  10 − contribi + 0,4 ∑
j = 1
4
  contribj 
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Right after the decision screen, we ask subjects about (i) their normative opinions about how much 
people should contribute to the public good and (ii) their beliefs about how much the other members of 
their group actually contributed on average. We then go about eliciting each of the three classes of social 
motives that has been put forward by economic theory to explain people’s willingness to sustain 
cooperation in the field.                               
 
(ii) Reciprocity motive. Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we use a modified version of the above 
Public Goods game to elicit subjects’ reciprocity motive. Implementing the so-called “strategy method”, 
we ask subjects to provide their intended contribution for each possible value (on the scale of integers 
from 0 to 10) of the average contribution of the three other members (see figure 2 for the corresponding 
decision screen). Subjects are told that their actual contribution to the common project will be randomly 
determined to be either their unconditional contribution from the standard Public Goods game or their 
current conditional contribution decision. We take the average proportion of the endowment that is 
conditionally contributed in the conditional Public Goods game as a measure of subjects’ reciprocity motive.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to provide an alternative measure for the reciprocity motive, we also conduct a standard Trust 
game among our subjects. Each participant A is matched with a participant B, and both players receive 
a $10 initial endowment. Participant A is the trustor and chooses how much of his endowment is 
transferred to participant B – the trustee. The trustee receives three times the amount sent by the 
trustor, and chooses how much is sent back to him. We elicit this decision through the strategy method: 
for each possible transfer from the trustor (from 1 to 10) the trustee chooses how much will be returned 
without knowing the trustor’s actual choice. We take the average proportion of the amount received that is 
returned by the trustee in the Trust game as an alternative measure of subjects’ reciprocity motive.  
 
(iii) Altruistic motive. The Dictator game is certainly experimental economics’ workhorse for studying 
altruistic motives. We thus use a standard Dictator game to elicit this preference among our subjects.9 
Each participant A is matched with a participant B to play as a dictator. The dictator receives a $10 
endowment, of which he must decide on how much is transferred to participant B. We take the 
proportion of the endowment transferred by the dictator as a measure of subjects’ altruistic motive. 
As we worry that the standard Dictator game may not capture subjects’ altruistic motive if they are 
incentivized to contribute to Wikipedia out of altruism directed towards their fellow contributors, we 
provide an alternative measure for this motive by conducting a second Dictator game in which we 
induce some in-group bias. We do this by telling subjects that they are now matched with another 
subject who “participates in online collaborative projects such as open source, free software or Wiki-
based authoring projects”. We take the proportion of the endowment transferred by the dictator in this directed 
decision as an alternative measure of subjects’ altruistic motive. 
 
(iv) Social image motive. Social image motives are difficult to measure experimentally – even more so 
in a decontextualized fashion, that is, out of a given social context. As a result, we rely on the 
observational data available from Wikipedia in order to elicit this preference. Specifically, we collect the 
                                                 
9 Note that the measures of altruism that we get from our Dictator games add-up the theoretically distinct “pure altruism” and 
“warm glow” motives. In this paper, we thus consider the joint effect of those two sub-components of altruism. 
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size (in bytes) of the personal user pages of our subjects and use this information to construct a 
measure of revealed preference for social image within Wikipedia (recall from section 2 that personal 
user pages do not play an important functional role in Wikipedia and are mainly used to present 
oneself to the community of contributors). Separating out regular contributors from Wikipedia administrator, 
we code as “social signaler” those who have a personal Wikipedia user page whose size (in bytes) is higher than 
the median in their group, and take this variable as a measure of subjects’ social image motive.  
In order to provide an alternative measure for subjects’ social image motive, we exploit Wikipedia’s 
main social rewarding practice: the Barnstars system. A Barnstar is a symbolic award constituted of an  
image accompanied by a personalized message acknowledging some important contribution made to 
the project by an editor (see figure 3 for an example).10  
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In theory, anyone can give or receive a Barnstar. This practice, however, remains largely limited to the 
body of engaged Wikipedia contributors who display relatively impressive contribution records. 
Barnstars are typically posted on a contributor’s talk page. They thus appear within the flow of 
discussions between this contributor and the rest of the community. After some time, a particular 
discussion thread is likely to be archived and/or become too long for anyone to easily notice that an 
award had been given. Some Wikipedia contributors choose to circumvent this by manually moving 
(some of) their Barnstars to their personal user pages (or some particular subsection of their user page 
generally labeled their “awards page”), so that they would be durably and prominently displayed for 
any other editor to see. We take such decisions as revealing a contributor’s motive for social image. 
From the subsample of subjects who received Barnstars (about 54% of our sample, the vast majority of whom are 
highly engaged contributors), we code as “social signalers” those who decided to display at least one of those 




3. 2    Experimental procedures 
 
The online implementation of the experiment requires a fully self-contained interface, so that every 
communication between the subjects and the experimenter has to proceed through the screen. The 
welcome page of the decision interface provides subjects with general information about the 
experiment, including the number of sections, expected completion time (about 25 minutes) and how 
their earnings will be computed. In order to minimize potential demand effects and in-group biases 
when eliciting subjects’ social motives, we were very careful not to present the study as Wikipedia 
oriented.11 Importantly, we made it very clear on the introductory screen that subjects would interact 
with a diverse pool of Internet users.12 
                                                 
10 The Wikipedia “Barnstars” page starts as follows: “It is the custom to reward Wikipedia contributors for hard work and due 
diligence by awarding them a barnstar. To give the award to someone, just place the image on their talk page (or their awards 
page), and explain why it was given. If you are sure the barnstar is appropriate, don't be shy!” See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Barnstars, accessed February 2013. 
11 The specific language used on the welcome page was as follows: “Our goal is to better understand the dynamics of 
interactions and behavior in online social spaces. To do so, we invite internet users with various profiles to fill out an 
interactive survey. We very much welcome participation from Wikipedia users!” Our strategy for framing the study as non 
Wikipedia oriented eventually proved more effective than we had anticipated. When we presented this research project to the 
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Subjects are only informed of their earnings in each game at the very end of the experiment. Final 
payoffs are equal to the earnings from one randomly selected game plus a $10 participation fee 
(subjects earned on average $20.50 from the experiment). Subjects get paid upon completion of the 
experiment through an automated PayPal transfer.13 We only require a valid e-mail address to process 
the payment. To strengthen the credibility of the payment procedure, we ask subjects to enter the e-
mail address that is (or will be) associated with their PayPal account right after the introductory screen 
of the decision interface. It is important to stress that Wikipedia contributors can be very hostile to 
monetary rewards. In order to ensure that the experiment is equally incentive compatible for all 
subjects, we allow them to donate any amount taken from their final earnings to the Wikimedia 
Foundation and/or the International Committee of the Red Cross – a renowned and general purpose 
charitable organization, in anticipation of the fact that some subjects might not want to donate to the 
Wikimedia Foundation – upon completion of the experiment. This possibility was made clear on the 
welcome screen of the decision interface. It was not possible, however, to commit to donating one’s 
final earnings prior to the study’s completion.  
All five decisions, followed by the survey, are made successively following a given sequence of 
screens. The unconditional and conditional Public Goods games are the most cognitively demanding. 
Accordingly, we always present those two decision problems first to subjects (in this order). As we 
don’t want the Dictator game with induced in-group bias to generate spillover effects on the other 
decisions, we always maintain both Dictator game decisions in last position. In order to alleviate 
anchoring effects, we sequentially vary the order in which the standard Dictator game and the directed 
Dictator game are presented to subject according to their login order. As a result, the standard Trust 
game was always presented in middle position.  
All decisions made by our subjects are anonymous. This is because contrary to the social image 
motive – which is by definition a public preference – all the preferences that we elicit experimentally are 
private preferences, meaning that they do not depend on the visibility of one’s actions to be at work.14 
As we want to elicit social motives in isolation from strategic concerns and learning effects, each game 
is only played once and we match subjects in each game according to a perfect stranger procedure.  
One important methodological concern with the online implementation of the experiment is to 
guarantee a quick and appropriate understanding of the decision problems when no interaction with 
the experimenter is possible. We strengthen the internal validity of our online experiment with three 
distinctive features of the interface. First, we include suggestive flash animations illustrating the 
written experimental instructions at the bottom of each game’s instruction screen (see figure 2 for the 
example of the standard Public Goods game).15 Second, the instructions screens are followed by a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Wikimedia Foundation staff, their initial reaction was: “Several people expressed concerns that there was not a clear connection 
between the contents of the survey and data that would be strategically useful at this time to Wikimedia community members 
and the Foundation. […] We hope that you will find another suitable outlet to recruit participants for your study. We're happy 
to answer questions about this decision, and we hope in the future to be able to support other projects you may be working on 
that are relevant to Wikimedia.” 
12 The Wikipedia subjects were matched with a traditional pool of laboratory subjects and with open-source software 
developers who both previously participated in a similar online experiment. 
13 Such a payment procedure guarantees a fungibility similar to that of cash transfers in lab experiments, as money transferred 
via PayPal can be readily used for online purchases or easily transferred to one’s personal bank account at no cost. 
14 Note that the concept of “social image motive” as it currently stands in the economics literature conflates several motives 
(e.g. relative social status within a group or relative competence assessment) all of which crucially depend on the visibility of 
one’s actions to be at work. We do not try to distinguish between those in this paper.  
15
 The loop of concrete examples displayed in each animation was first randomly determined and then fixed for each game. The 
same loop is displayed to all subjects without any other numeric information than the subjects’ initial endowments. We 
decided against displaying a purely random sequence of flash animations as it could have introduced uncontrolled and subject 
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screen providing some examples of decisions, along with the detailed calculation of the resulting 
payoffs for each player. These examples are supplemented on the subsequent screen by earnings 
calculators. On this interactive page, subjects are allowed to test all the hypothetical scenarios they are 
interested in before making their decisions in the Public Goods and Trust games. In contrast to the 
illustrative flash animations, the numeric results of each scenario run by a subject in the earnings 
calculator screens are explicitly displayed. Last, the system provides a quick access to the instructions 
material at any moment during decision-making. On all screens, including decision-making ones, a 
“review description” button gives subjects a direct access to the instructions displayed at the beginning 
of the game. The system also allows participants to navigate at will from one screen to another – until a 
decision screen has been passed – through the “Previous” and “Next” buttons located at the bottom of 
each screen (see figure 3 for the example of the conditional Public Goods game decision screen).   
 
 
3. 3    Implementation of the experiment 
 
Our dependent variable of interest is the total number of field contributions that a subject has made to 
Wikipedia over his history with the project. A Wikipedia contribution, or “edit”, is defined as the 
action of (i) going to a Wikipedia page (ii) hitting the “edit” tab (iii) implementing a modification and 
(iv) saving the modification. We only recruit from Wikipedia registered users (i.e. individuals who 
created a Wikipedia account) in order to be able to track subjects’ full contribution records.16 
In order to best explain the dynamics of the project, we want to capture the very wide heterogeneity 
in registered editors’ contributions patterns (see section 2 for some background statistics on this topic). 
To do so, we decide to recruit our subjects from the three following groups: 
  
(i) The cohort of new Wikipedia contributors, defined as all individuals who registered a 
Wikipedia account within the 30 days prior to the launch of the experiment, irrespective of the 
number of contributions (if any) that they made. Eligible population = 190,327 subjects.  
(ii) The group of engaged Wikipedia contributors, defined as all contributors who made at least 
300 contributions to Wikipedia and are still currently active (i.e. they made at least 20 contributions 
in the last 180 days).17 Eligible population = 18,989 subjects. 
(iii) The group of Wikipedia administrators. Those highly engaged contributors successfully 
decided to run for a very selective peer-review process, at the end of which they were entitled with 
special oversight rights over the encyclopedia in order to perform a policing role. They notably can 
block disruptive users and protect vandalized pages. Eligible population = 1,388 subjects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
specific noise–through, e.g., anchoring on a particular behavior or sequence of events. Our goal with those animations was to 
illustrate the basic gist of each decision problem in an accessible way while avoiding to prime specific numerical examples and 
results in subjects’ mind. 
16 One might worry about selection effects here. To be sure, this paper does not try to generate results that could be 
generalizable beyond the population of registered contributors to Wikipedia. In terms of the potential bias induced on our 
estimates by this selection criterion, we think that insofar as the mere action of registering a Wikipedia account can, on average, 
be interpreted as a step towards becoming a contributor to the project, then the coefficients on our prosocial motives variables, 
if they are significant in the true population model, should be biased downwards (as we select on having gone through that 
step already).  
17 Note that this definition of an “engaged contributor” corresponds to the community’s criteria for being eligible and able to 
vote in the 2011 elections of the Wikimedia Foundation Board of Trustees. See 
http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Board_elections/2011/en#Prerequisites_to_candidacy, accessed February 2013.  
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We use the Wikipedia banner system as a convenient recruitment device for our experiment. The 
banner system is prominently used by the Wikimedia Foundation for its annual fundraising and is thus 
relatively familiar even to non Wikipedia contributors. It is also used by the community of editors for 
purposes of extended internal communication (e.g., to advertise events and other community 
initiatives). As a result, the banner system is certainly the most powerful and trusted way of reaching 
out to a wide and diverse audience within Wikipedia. In coordination with the Wikimedia Foundation 
staff, we coded this recruitment banner so that it would be displayed at the top of every Wikipedia 
page for all logged-in eligible users, until he or she decided either to click on it, or to disable it (see 
Figure 4, which features the recruitment banner).18  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Upon clicking on the banner, eligible users were uniquely identified by the system (through their 
Wikipedia user id number, which then allowed us to collect their entire contribution history to 
Wikipedia) and redirected to the welcome screen of our experimental economics platform. Within each 
of the three above-defined experimental groups, our system sequentially allocated subjects to the role 
of participant A or participant B according to their login order. Those allocated to the role of participant 
A were in turn sequentially allocated to one of the two possible ordering of the standard and directed 
Dictator games (in order to alleviate possible anchoring effects). We implemented this procedure both 
to ensure that we get relatively balanced samples and to randomize the allocation of participants in the 
role of participant A and participant B. The experiment was launched on December 8th 2011 and the 
banner recruited 850 subjects in 8 hours (i.e. about 2 complete answers per minute).   
 
 
4    Results 
 
We organize the presentation of our results in three steps. We start by presenting some descriptive 
statistics about our subjects pool. We then rely on our experimental data (i) to study the relationship 
between subjects’ propensity to cooperate in a standard Public Goods dilemma and their field 
contributions to Wikipedia and (ii) to test for the role of altruism and reciprocity as social motives for 
contributing to the project. We end this section by presenting our observational evidence regarding the 
role of social image motives.  
 
 
4. 1    Descriptive statistics  
 
 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics per experimental group on (i) the number of Wikipedia 
contributions made by our subjects (ii) our measures of social motives and (iii) our demographic 
variables. Overall, we recruited 149 subjects from the cohort of new Wikipedia contributors, 566 from 
the group of engaged Wikipedia contributors and 120 from the group of Wikipedia administrators. 
Because the data used to calculate the eligibility metrics was missing for some users in the Wikipedia 
                                                 
18 This was the first (and is still the only) time in the history of the Wikimedia movement that the banner system was left to use 
by a third-party. Its selective display system remains Wikimedia’s most sophisticated one to date. 
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API, 15 Wikipedia contributors were displayed the recruitment banner and participated in the 
experiment while not being formally eligible to do so. As we are equally able to track the contribution 
records of those subjects, we also include them in our analysis.19  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For each experimental group, figure 5 compares the distribution of the number of Wikipedia 
contributions for the whole sample of eligible contributors against our sub-sample of participants. 
Focusing on the groups of engaged Wikipedia contributors and Wikipedia administrators, we can see 
that the distribution of the number of Wikipedia contributions for our sub-samples of subjects closely 
mirror those of the reference groups. We do seem to capture contributors with higher contribution 
records on average, however, as we can see from both distributions being slightly skewed to the right. 
We reach a similar conclusion when we focus on the cohort of new Wikipedia contributors. Out of 149 
subjects, 62% have never made any contribution to Wikipedia (as opposed to 73% in the reference 
group) and 27% made between 1 and 10 contributions (as opposed to 25% in the reference group). 11% 
of our new contributors, however, are already highly engaged with Wikipedia and made more than 10 
– and up to 273 – contributions to Wikipedia (as opposed to 2% in the reference group).20   
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another way to look at how representative of the overall population of Wikipedia registered editors our 
sample of subjects might be is to pool them all together and compare their demographic characteristics 
against those of the 5,073 registered editors who took part in the 2011 Wikimedia editor survey. 
Designed by the Wikimedia Foundation, this survey was precisely implemented so as to get as 
representative a picture as possible of the profiles of Wikipedia editors.21 Similar to the present study, it 
was advertized through a Wikipedia banner. It ran for 7 days over the whole population of registered 
Wikipedia editors. Table 2 compares the commonly available demographic information in both studies. 
It appears that demographic characteristics between both samples are very similar. Contrary to the 
popular perception that most Wikipedia contributors are high school students, we find that they are on 
average much older (33 years old with 48% of the population being above 29 in our study versus 32 
years old with 47% being above 29 in the Wikimedia editor survey) and more educated (63% have 
finished college and 28% have a Master’s or a PhD degree in our study versus 61 and 26% in the 
Wikimedia editor survey, respectively). Consistent with the common perception, however, we find the 
population of contributors to be predominantly male (90% in our study versus 89% in the Wikimedia 
editor survey).    
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Taken together, we interpret the above evidence as suggesting that our sample of Wikipedia subjects is 
representative of the diversity of contribution patterns and demographic profiles found on Wikipedia.  
 
                                                 
19 All of the results presented in this paper remain unaffected if we leave those 15 subjects out of the analysis.  
20 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distribution functions confirms this conclusion at p<0.001 in all three 
experimental groups.  




4. 2    Experimental results on altruistic and reciprocity motives 
 
Our dependent variable – the number of Wikipedia contributions made by each subject – follows a 
strong power law distribution. As this distribution is characterized by overdispersion (likelihood ratio 
test: p<0.001), we use negative binomial instead of Poisson regressions to properly model the structure 
of our data.22 In all of our below analysis, we consider the group of Wikipedia administrators as a 
conceptually distinct class of contributors. We therefore analyze this group separately from our sample 
of “regular” Wikipedia contributors.  
Table 3 begins by investigating whether subjects’ propensity to contribute in a standard Public 
Goods dilemma predicts the number of contributions that they made to Wikipedia. Column (1) only 
includes our demographic control variables. The model globally confirms our qualitative observations 
from the previous section: being one year older is on average associated with a 1.7% increase in the 
number of Wikipedia contributions, while moving from a high school education to getting a Master’s 
degree is associated with a 26% increase. Being a female, however, is associated with a 44% decrease in 
the number of contributions made to Wikipedia. The coefficient on the salary level variable is very close 
to zero and not statistically significant. Finally, the effect of risk aversion seems somewhat 
counterintuitive: moving from generally being “unwilling to take risks” to being “fully prepared to take 
risks” is actually associated with a 43% decrease in the number of Wikipedia contributions.   
We introduce our measure of cooperation in column (2). The coefficient on this variable is positive 
and highly statistically significant: moving from being a free-rider to being a full contributor in our 
standard Public Goods game is associated with a 49% increase in the number of Wikipedia 
contributions, which is about twice the effect associated with moving from a high school to a graduate 
education. This average effect conceals an interesting underlying heterogeneity within our population of 
subjects, however. In columns (3) and (4) we divide our sample of regular contributors in two equal 
parts according to the median of the number of contributions that they made to Wikipedia (i.e. 1905 
contributions, which already represents a rather impressive contribution record) and run the exact same 
regressions as in model (2) for both sub-populations (thereafter denoted as the “below median” and 
“above median” groups). We can see that while the coefficient on cooperation increases by 45% and 
remains highly statistically significant for the below median group, its value is virtually zero in the 
above median group. This suggests that the relationship uncovered in model (2) is in fact entirely driven 
by the sub-population of new to engaged Wikipedia contributors who are not “super contributors”. 
Accordingly, it is interesting to note that while the effect of our demographic variables remains 
qualitatively the same within the below median group, none of them reliably predict contribution 
patterns within the group of highest contributors.  
Last, column (5) of table 3 presents our result for the group of Wikipedia administrators. Although 
the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level, its sign strikes us as somewhat counterintuitive: admin 
subjects who are relatively more cooperative in the Public Goods game tend, on average, to contribute 
relatively less to Wikipedia. Within this group, moving from being a free-rider to being a full contributor 
in the standard Public Goods game is associated with a 54% decrease in the number of Wikipedia 
contributions.  
 
                                                 
22 As a robustness check, we also tried transforming our dependent variable as ln(1 + number of Wikipedia contributions) in order 
to run OLS regressions, and obtained consistent results (tables available from the authors upon request). 
15 
 
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
With those results in mind, we now turn to the theoretical question of interest and start by 
investigating which private social motive, altruism or reciprocity, better accounts for subject’s 
willingness to sustain cooperation in the field. Panel A of table 4 presents our results for altruism while 
panel B presents our results for reciprocity. As we have two alternative experimental measures for each 
social motive, we include them in turn in our models to check for consistency. All the estimations in 
this table include the same demographic controls as in table 3. Focusing on altruism (panel A), we can 
see that no statistically significant relationship appears with field contributions. This is true irrespective 
of whether we consider the whole sample of regular subjects (columns (1) and (2)) or, as in table 3, 
separate them in two sub-populations according to the median of their number of Wikipedia 
contributions (columns (3) to (6)).    
The picture is completely different when we turn to our measures of reciprocity, however. In 
columns (1) and (2) of panel B, we see that moving from no reciprocity to full reciprocity in the 
conditional Public Goods game and in the standard Trust game is associated with a significant 46% and 
56% increase in the number of Wikipedia contributions, respectively.23 Consistent with our findings on 
cooperation, the effect is both stronger and more statistically significant in the below median group 
(columns (3) and (4)), while it appears as insignificant in the above median group (columns (5) and (6)). 
Focusing on the below median group, moving from no reciprocity to full reciprocity is associated with 
a 122% and 211% increase in the number of Wikipedia contributions, depending on the experimental 
measure of reciprocity that we consider. 
Overall, our results so far indicate that subjects’ willingness to sustain their contributions to 
Wikipedia is related to their propensity to contribute in a standard Public Goods dilemma, and that the 
main private social motive behind such cooperative dispositions is reciprocity as opposed to altruism.24 
Interestingly, however, those conclusions only apply to the sub-population of new to engaged 
Wikipedia contributors who are not “super contributors”.  
We end this section by discussing the last two columns of table 4, which present our results on 
altruism and reciprocity for the group of Wikipedia administrators. Consistent with what we find 
within the group of regular Wikipedia contributors, we see no statistically significant relationship 
between our measures of altruism and the number of field contributions made to Wikipedia. Turning 
our attention to the reciprocity variables, we find that admin subjects who reveal a relatively lower 
                                                 
23 Here we define “full reciprocity” as the act of exactly matching other players’ average contributions in the conditional Public 
Goods game and of returning the amount that was received in the standard Trust game. In this latter case, “full reciprocity” is 
thus defined in a strong sense, as the trustee allows the trustor to reap all the efficiencies created through his decision to 
transfer a fraction of his endowment.  
24 We can take advantage of the fact that all subjects in the experiment participated in the conditional Public Goods game to 
investigate how the coefficients on the reciprocity measure derived from this game (reported in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of 
table 4 – panel B) behave when we control for either of our measures of altruism in the regressions (see table A.1. in the 
Appendix). We see that even if the coefficients now fail to reach statistical significance in the whole sample of regular 
contributors, they change very little and remain statistically significant at the 10% level in the below median group. This 
reduction in the statistical significance of the reciprocity coefficients can be explained by the fact that (i) including our measures 
of altruism in the regressions cuts our samples by half and (ii) our reciprocity measure exhibits a 0.38 and 0.36 correlation 
coefficient with our measures of general altruism and directed altruism, respectively (p<0.001 in both cases). When we focus on 
the group of Wikipedia administrators, on the other hand, we see that the economic and statistical significance of the 
reciprocity coefficient presented in column (7) of table 4 – panel B even increases when we control for altruism. 
Furthermore, when we include the same reciprocity variable together with our general altruism variable in an OLS regression 
explaining subjects’ contribution decisions in the standard Public Goods game, we obtain that the former is the only one that is 
significantly related to subjects’ willingness to cooperate in the Public Goods dilemma (table available from the authors upon 




preference for reciprocity in the games tend to contribute relatively more to the project. This pattern is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for both reciprocity variables, and is consistent with the result 
from table 3. Within this group, moving from no reciprocity to full reciprocity is associated with a 88% 
and 169% decrease in the number of Wikipedia contributions, depending on the experimental measure 
of reciprocity that we consider. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The finding that the administrators who contribute relatively more to the Wikipedia project exhibit a 
lower preference for reciprocity on average is further supplemented by the fact that they also exhibit 
lower levels of trust, as measured by the proportion of their endowment that they transferred as 
trustors in the Trust game (see table A.2). To be sure, the transfer decisions in the Trust game are 
irrelevant to our field test of existing economic theories of prosocial motives for contributing to real-
world public goods. Rather, those decisions were elicited as part of our procedure for providing a 
second measure of taste for reciprocity, when subjects were put in the position of trustees in the Trust 
game. That said, we find it striking that this group is the only one within which we can find an 
economically and statistically significant relationship between trust levels and the number of 
contributions made to Wikipedia, which tends to align with the above finding that highly contributing 
administrators are less reciprocal on average. We hypothesize that such negative correlations between 
Wikipedia participation and prosociality levels within the group of administrators might be related to 
the fact that those engaged contributors self-selected into performing a policing role within the 
community of editors.   
 
 
4. 3    The role of social image motives 
 
As we have seen from the previous section, reciprocity, as opposed to altruism, appears as the major 
private social preference associated with the trajectory of Wikipedia users from a non-contributor to a 
regular contributor. This preference, however, does not seem to continue to predict the trajectories of 
the highest regular contributors to Wikipedia, and is even negatively associated with the number of 
contributions made by Wikipedia administrators. In this section, we rely on observational data to 
investigate the role of social image motives in our subjects’ willingness to contribute to the Wikipedia 
project.  
Within our sample of regular and admin subjects, respectively, we code as “social signaler” those 
who have a personal Wikipedia user page whose size (in bytes) is higher than the median in each 
group. Alternatively, from the sub-sample of subjects who received social awards – or Barnstars – from 
other Wikipedia contributors (i.e. 456 subjects, representing 54% of our total sample), we code as 
“social signalers” those who decided to advertize at least one of those awards on their personal user 
page.25 According to this measure, 54% of Barnstars receivers reveal a preference for social image. 
Importantly, 81% of Barnstars receivers in the sample of regular subjects have a contribution record 
that is higher than the median, so that the coefficient on this variable will mainly tells us about the role 
                                                 
25 As a robustness check, we also computed the proportion of received Barnstars that subjects decided to manually move to their 
personal user pages as an alternative indicator of their social image motive. The results are unaffected (table available from the 
authors upon request).  
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of social image motives in the above median group. As we expect subjects who receive more Barnstars 
to have a higher probability of exhibiting one of them on their personal user page (at least in a 
statistical sense), and as the total number of Barnstars received should be highly correlated with the 
number of Wikipedia contributions made, we include the total number of Barnstars received as a 
control in all the regressions that rely on this measure of social image to avoid potential spurious 
correlations.  
Table 5.1 presents the results of those new estimations for all regular contributors. We see from 
column (1) that subjects who reveal a preference for social image by having a relatively larger 
Wikipedia user page make on average 269% more contributions to Wikipedia. This highly statistically 
significant result confirms the hypothesis that those who care relatively more about their social image 
within the community of editors also contribute more to the Wikipedia project.  
To check for heterogeneous effects, we also run the exact same regression as in model (1) separately 
in the above and the below median groups. We can see from column (4) that, in agreement with what 
we found in the case of reciprocity, the coefficient on social image increases by 38% in the below 
median group and remains highly statistically significant. Contrary to what we found in the case of 
reciprocity, however, a revealed preference for social image continues to reliably predict the number of 
contributions made to Wikipedia within the group of highest contributors to Wikipedia, even if the 
magnitude of the coefficient is significantly reduced. Indeed, in the above median group, social 
signalers make on average 30% more contributions to the Wikipedia project. This last result is 
confirmed when we rely on our Barnstars data to construct an alternative indicator of social image and 
obtain that social signalers make on average 33% more contributions to Wikipedia (see column (10)).  
So far, we have established that our measures of reciprocity and social image – but not altruism – 
can predict the trajectory of Wikipedia users from a non-contributor to a regular contributor. Unlike 
reciprocity, however, a taste for social image continues to predict the number of field contributions 
made by our subjects even within the group of highest contributors to Wikipedia.  
Building upon this result, a natural question to ask is that of the nature of the interaction (if any) 
between reciprocity and social image as other-regarding motives for contributing to Wikipedia. We 
answer this question by investigating whether our experimental measures of reciprocity predict the 
number of contributions that our subjects make to Wikipedia differentially, depending on whether they 
reveal a concern for their social image within the Wikipedia community or not. To achieve this goal, we 
estimate models (1), (4), (7) and (10) again. This time, however, we estimate the coefficients on the 
reciprocity motive separately for social signalers and non social signalers.  
Focusing on column (2) and (3), we can see that, irrespective of the experimental measure of 
reciprocity that we consider, the predictive power of this preference on the number of field 
contributions to Wikipedia seems to be concentrated within the group of non social signalers, that is 
contributors who do not reveal a relatively high preference for social image within Wikipedia. 
Restricting the sample to the below median group and running the same regressions reinforces this 
conclusion. We can see from columns (5) and (6) that the coefficients on reciprocity in the group of 
social signalers are positive, but remain statistically insignificant. The coefficients on reciprocity in the 
group of non social signalers, by contrast, remain highly statistically significant and increase by 66% 
and 10%, respectively. Finally, turning our attention to the above median group, we obtain a picture 
that is consistent with that of table 4 where we found no relationship anymore between reciprocity and 
the number of contributions made to Wikipedia by the most highly engaged contributors. Indeed, none 
of the reciprocity coefficients reaches the 5% significance level in the above median group. This is true 
irrespective of whether we consider the sub-group of social signalers or non social signalers, and of 
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whether we compute our measure of social image using our personal user page size data (columns (8) 
and (9)) or using our Barnstars data (columns (11) and (12)).  
At the end of the day, what those estimations suggest is that both reciprocity and social image are 
powerful predictors of individuals’ willingness to sustain cooperation in a real-world public goods like 
environment such as Wikipedia, but that they seem to be substitutable rather than complementary 
motivational drivers (i.e. both motives are at play, but in different subsets of the population of 
contributors).  
 
[TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We end this section by presenting our estimations for the group of Wikipedia administrators in table 
5.2. A general fact is that when compared to the group of engaged Wikipedia contributors from which 
they recruit their members (i.e. excluding new contributors), Wikipedia administrators seem to be 
significantly more concerned about their social image within Wikipedia, as their personal user pages 
are on average 39% larger than those of the engaged contributors (p=0.001) and the proportion of their 
received Barnstars that they decide to advertize on their personal user pages is 10% higher (p=0.041).  
Still, we can see from column (1) that our social image measure continues to predict the number of 
field contributions made to Wikipedia, even within the group of Wikipedia administrators. Specifically, 
Wikipedia administrators who reveal a relatively higher taste for social image as measured by the size 
of their user page make on average 42% more contributions to the Wikipedia project. This relationship, 
however, does not hold anymore if we compute our social image variable using our Barnstars data (see 
column (4)).  
Turning our attention to the study of the interaction between reciprocity and social image (see 
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)), we observe that the coefficients on the reciprocity variables are negative in 
all estimations, irrespective of whether we consider the sub-group of administrators who reveal a 
relatively lower or relatively higher taste for social image. This result tends to reinforce the conclusion 
from table 4, in which we uncovered a negative relationship between administrators’ taste for 
reciprocity and their contributions to Wikipedia. It is interesting to note, however, that only one of the 
reciprocity coefficients out of four is statistically significant in the sub-group of relatively low social 
signalers, while all of them are highly statistically significant in the sub-group of high social signalers. 
This indicates that the average negative relationship between administrators’ taste for reciprocity and 
Wikipedia participation is in fact largely driven by the population of high social signalers.  
 
[TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5    Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive field test of existing economic theories of prosocial 
motives for contributing to real-world public goods. We elicited the social preferences of a diverse 
sample of 850 Wikipedia contributors with an online experiment coupled with observational data and 
tested for their predictive power over records of contributions to the Wikipedia project. In this peer 
production economy in which extrinsic incentives play no role in shaping individual behavior, we find a 
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sizeable relationship between prosocial motivations and individuals’ willingness to sustain cooperation. 
Specifically, it is possible to summarize our results as follows:  
 
1. For regular (i.e. non admin) contributors: 
i. Reciprocity and social image – but not altruism – appear as underlying social preferences that 
predict the trajectory of Wikipedia users from a non-contributor to an engaged contributor.  
ii. In this process, reciprocity and social image seem to be substitutes rather than complementary 
motivational drivers (i.e. each motive is at play, but in different subsets of the population of 
contributors).  
iii. A taste for reciprocity does not continue to predict the trajectory of those Wikipedia users who 
become super-contributor, while a taste for social image does.   
 
2. For Wikipedia administrators: 
i. On average, engaged contributors who hold admin status reveal a higher taste for social 
image than regular engaged contributors.   
ii. Even within this group of high social signalers, there is some evidence that administrators 
who value their social image relatively more contribute more.  
iii. There is strong evidence that within the group of administrators, Wikipedia participation is 
negatively associated with a taste for reciprocity (and, incidentally, to trust levels as measured 
by the Trust game), with the effect being mostly concentrated among those who reveal a 
relatively higher taste for social image.  
 
The results of our field experiment have important theoretical implications, as they strongly support the 
models of voluntary provision of public goods based on reciprocity and social image motives, but not 
those based on altruistic motives. In this respect, it is reinsuring to note that this overarching conclusion 
is strongly consistent with the results of the extensive literature from the lab that has tried to test for the 
role of those three classes of social motives in people’s willingness to sustain cooperation in repeated 
public goods experiments (see footnote 6).  
On top of being able to test for a link between individual measures of preferences and independently 
collected records of contributions to a real-world public good, our theoretically comprehensive approach 
also allows us to study the nature of the interaction between the preferences that appear to matter. We 
find that while both a taste for reciprocity and social image predict the trajectory of Wikipedia users 
from a non-contributor to an engaged one, those motivational drivers tend to be substitutable rather 
than complementary in our population of subjects. Further, only social image continues to correlate with 
the contribution records of the population of super contributors to the public good.   
Taken globally, our results strikingly corroborate the findings of the single related study of 
Wikipedia in the economics literature: focusing on the Chinese Wikipedia, Zhang and Zhu (2011) find 
that after an exogenous reduction in contributors’ group size, the nonblocked contributors decreased 
their contributions by 42.8% on average. The authors hypothesize that their findings might be due to 
what they call “social effects”, that is social benefits that would accrue to contributors as the size of their 
group grows. Our results support and precise their hypothesis, as models based on reciprocity and 
social image would both predict an increase in individual contributions following an increase in the size 
of the group of contributors, while models based on altruism would either predict no impact (in the case 
of warm-glow) or even a decrease (in the case of pure altruism) in individual contributions.  
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Focusing on the small body of engaged Wikipedia contributors who hold admin status, we find that 
when compared to the group of engaged but regular Wikipedia contributors from which it recruits its 
members, this group reveals a higher average taste for social image. However, even within this group of 
high social signalers, we find that revealing a relatively higher taste for social image continues to predict 
higher records of contributions to the project. Perhaps the most surprising of our findings is that we also 
find a strong negative relationship between Wikipedia participation and taste for reciprocity (and, 
incidentally, trust, as measured by the Trust game) within the group of Wikipedia administrators, so 
that relatively higher contributors in this position are actually less prosocial on average. We hypothesize 
that this finding could be due to those engaged contributors having self-selected into holding the “stick” 
of the Wikipedia community to perform a policing role within the extended body of Wikipedia editors.  
Beyond their theoretical relevance, our results also have important implications for practitioners who 
seek to leverage intrinsic motivations to promote Internet-based voluntary cooperation for the provision 
of public goods. If anything, from Wikipedia to Open Source Software, the impressive achievements of 
Internet-based peer production in the last 15 years are an indication that intrinsic motivations generally 
construed (including, but not limited to, prosocial motivations) can be very powerful at incentivizing 
work, and should represent more than a simple add-on to the economic theory of optimal extrinsic 
incentives schemes. Wikipedia is a textbook case for the peer production model, as well as a striking 
success story. How much this model of voluntary provision of public goods over the Internet will 
continue to scale-up probably depends on how good practitioners will be at efficiently designing large 
scale human interaction systems that incentivize voluntary participation. Our findings suggest that to 
maximize individual contributions, some special emphasis should be put on the human interactivity 
side of those systems coupled with some public recognition mechanisms, which will notably continue to 
incentivize the highest potential contributors.  
We are, of course, only beginning to uncover the nature of the intrinsic motives that drive individuals 
to voluntarily sustain cooperation in the field. These motives are likely to be diverse. Much more field 
work needs to be done to see if the literature will be able to identify some general underlying 
preferences that would be systematically associated with sustained patterns of contribution to real-
world public goods, irrespective of the context in which such contributions take place. It could also be, 
however, that the motives that drive contributions highly depend on the nature of the public good 
considered, which could in turn explain some of the contradicting laboratory results in the literature (see 
Vesterlund (2012) and Ostrom (1990)). Although the Internet is a rather specific field of study, we 
suggest that there is increasing scope for learning from an online approach coupling the tools of 
experimental economics with computational social science techniques. This is true in the sense that the 
Internet allows to run experiments eliciting individual preference parameters from large and diverse 
populations, and to connect those preferences to very detailed observational data on individual 
behavior. As such, we view our methodology as a way to relieve the traditional tension between internal 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the number of Wikipedia contributions per experimental group:  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. mean number of Wikipedia contributions = mean number of modifications implemented in 
Wikipedia (minimum and maximum values are reported in brackets). Degree level: 1 = “less than high school”; 2 = “high school”; 3 = “some 
college”; 4 = “2 years college degree”; 5 = “4 years college degree (BA, BS)”; 6 = “masters degree"; 7 = “professional degree (MD, JD)”; 8 = 
“doctoral degree”. Salary level (monthly): 1 = “0 USD”; 2 = “less than 1000 USD”; 3 = “between 1000 and 2000 USD”; 4 = “between 2000 and 
3000 USD”; 5 = “between 3000 and 4000 USD”; 6 = “between 4000 and 5000 USD”; 7 = “between 5000 and 7500 USD”; 8 = “between 7500 and 
10000 USD”; 9 = “more than 10000 USD”. Risk aversion level = whether subjects generally see themselves as fully prepared to take risks as 














Number of observations (N) 149 566 120 15 
     
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
    
        Mean – number of Wikipedia contributions 8.64 9719.83 41229.24 543.13 
 
(3.56) (23519.39) (86191.33) (1664.19) 
 
[0; 273] [303; 364157] [2475; 922895] [0; 6547] 
SOCIAL PREFERENCES MEASURES 
    
    Cooperation (N=850) 
    
Proportion of endowment unconditionally contributed – Public Goods 5.58 6.64 6.19 7.13 
 
(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) 
    Altruism (N=405) 
    
(i) Proportion of endowment transferred – Dictator  0.38 0.36 0.42 0.28 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) 
(ii) Proportion of endowment transferred –  in-group Dictator  0.46 0.45 0.48 0.40 
 
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.20) 
    Reciprocity (N=850 & N=445) 
    
(i) Average proportion of endowment conditionally contributed – Public Goods  0.45 0.54 0.52 0.52 
 
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) 
(ii) Average proportion of amount returned  – Trust 0.45 0.51 0.46 0.54 
 
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) 
    Social image (N=456 & N=850) 
    
  (i) Mean size of Wikipedia user page (in bytes) 453.81 5586.24 9179.64 1238.60 
 
(3597.62) (10859.97) (11012.09) (3438.12) 
Number of Barnstars receivers 4 340 109 3 
Mean - number of Barnstars received 1.5 6.14 16.8 5 
 
(0.58) (8.57) (15.99) (6.93) 
(ii) Proportion signaling Barnstars 0.25 0.50 0.70 0.33 
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.58) 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
    
          Age 27 34 34 33 
 
(11.81) (14.73) (12.86) (8.84) 
         Proportion female 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.07 
 
(0.36) (0.29) (0.31) (0.26) 
         Degree level 3.97 4.55 4.88 4.73 
 
(1.92) (1.80) (1.64) (1.75) 
          Salary level 3.17 3.80 4.01 3.79 
 
(2.15) (2.34) (2.25) (2.12) 
          Risk aversion level 6.16 5.66 5.53 4.67 
 




Table 2. Sample common demographic characteristics:  


















Notes: The Wikimedia editor survey excludes respondents 
under 12 and over 82 from the sample. The age and gender 
statistics are based on the population of respondents with a 
positive number of Wikipedia contributions (N=4,930). The 
Education level statistics are based on the whole population 
of respondents (N=5,073). In this table, we base our own 
statistics on the same calculation rules.   
 
 




















Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Cooperation – Public Goods = proportion of endowment unconditionally contributed to the public good. 
Model (1) is all non admin subjects; model (2) is non admin subjects below the median number of Wikipedia contributions 
(i.e. 1905 contributions); model (3) is non admin subjects above the median number of Wikipedia contributions; model (4) is 
all admin subjects.   
 
2011 Wikimedia 
editor survey Our study 
Age 
  
        12 to 17 13% 4% 
        18 to 21 14% 17% 
        22 to 29 26% 30% 
        30 to 39 19% 20% 
        40 or more 28% 28% 
Gender  
  
        Proportion female 9% 10% 
Education level  
  
        Primary  9% 5% 
        Secondary  30% 31% 
        Bachelors / associate 35% 34% 
        Master's 18% 22% 
        PhD 8% 7% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable:  













    Cooperation – Public Goods  0.400*** 0.578*** 0.0253 -0.430* 
 
 (0.126) (0.195) (0.137) (0.220) 
age 0.0167*** 0.0163*** 0.0139*** 0.00505 0.0167*** 
 
(0.00306) (0.00310) (0.00524) (0.00344) (0.00542) 
female -0.365** -0.346** -0.652*** -0.0323 -0.160 
 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.244) (0.152) (0.252) 
degree level 0.0582** 0.0494** 0.0852** 0.0166 -0.0369 
 
(0.0246) (0.0250) (0.0370) (0.0309) (0.0445) 
salary level 0.00282 0.00262 -0.00758 -0.0134 -0.0465 
 
(0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0312) (0.0225) (0.0303) 
prepared to take risks -0.0325* -0.0426** -0.0809*** -0.00250 0.0127 
 
(0.0169) (0.0174) (0.0272) (0.0198) (0.0280) 
Constant 8.310*** 8.149*** 5.651*** 9.411*** 10.62*** 
 
(0.175) (0.183) (0.282) (0.195) (0.300) 
 
 
    N 649 649 325 324 113 
Pseudo R2 0.00507 0.00596 0.00923 0.000493 0.00526 
28 
 










Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Altruism – Dictator = 
proportion of endowment transferred in the Dictator game. Altruism – Dictator in-group = proportion of endowment transferred in the directed Dictator game. Reciprocity – Public 
Goods = average proportion of endowment conditionally contributed in the Public Goods game strategy method; Reciprocity – Trust = average proportion of amount received that 
is returned by the subject in the Trust game strategy method. Models (1) and (2) are all non admin subjects; models (3) and (4) are non admin subjects below the median number 
of Wikipedia contributions (i.e. 1905 contributions); models (5) and (6) are non admin subjects above the median number of Wikipedia contributions; models (7) and (8) are all 







  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable:  

















 Panel A: Altruism                 

































Constant 8.237*** 8.281*** 5.854*** 5.894*** 9.175*** 9.257*** 10.10*** 10.09*** 
 
(0.257) (0.265) (0.404) (0.413) (0.269) (0.275) (0.301) (0.307) 
         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 305 305 159 159 146 146 56 56 
Pseudo R2 0.00698 0.00699 0.00834 0.00833 0.00226 0.00257 0.0112 0.0112 
 Panel B: Reciprocity                 

































Constant 8.189*** 8.183*** 5.660*** 5.430*** 9.457*** 9.548*** 10.61*** 10.97*** 
 
(0.183) (0.260) (0.278) (0.395) (0.200) (0.275) (0.299) (0.525) 
         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 649 344 325 166 324 178 113 57 
Pseudo R2 0.00554 0.00516 0.00959 0.0142 0.000535 0.000572 0.00538 0.00594 
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 Table 5.1 Association between number of Wikipedia contributions and social image motivation (non admin subjects) 
Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Social signaler (Barnstars) = 1 if the subject decided 
to advertise at least one of his Barnstars on his user page (0 otherwise). Social signaler (user page) = 1 if the subject has a Wikipedia user page whose size (in bytes) is greater than the median in the 
sample of all non admin subjects. Reciprocity – Public Goods = average proportion of endowment conditionally contributed in the Public Goods game strategy method; Reciprocity – Trust = average 
proportion of amount received that is returned by the subject in the Trust game strategy method. nb Barnstars = total number of Barnstars received by each subject. Models (1) to (3) are all non admin 
subjects who received Barnstars; models (4) to (6) are all non admin subjects; models (7) to (9) are non admin subjects below the median number of Wikipedia contributions (i.e. 1905 contributions); 
models (10) to (12) are non admin subjects above the median number of Wikipedia contributions.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variable: 

























             
Social signaler (user page) 1.305*** 1.648*** 2.021*** 1.805*** 2.096*** 2.133*** 0.261*** 0.678*** 0.562    
 (0.0845) (0.190) (0.281) (0.126) (0.270) (0.466) (0.101) (0.230) (0.348)    
Social signaler (Barnstars) 
        
 0.288*** 0.665*** 0.812** 
 
        
 (0.0969) (0.224) (0.335) 













(0.228)     













(0.321)     













(0.316)    













(0.507)    
Reciprocity – Public Goods x Social signaler (Barnstars) 
        
  -0.324  
 
        
  (0.242)  
Reciprocity – Public Goods x non Social signaler (Barnstars) 
        
  0.349  
 
        
  (0.263)  
Reciprocity – Trust x Social signaler (Barnstars) 
        
   -0.614* 
 
        
   (0.337) 
Reciprocity – Trust x non Social signaler (Barnstars) 
        
   0.154 
 
        
   (0.497) 
nb Barnstars 
        
 0.0405*** 0.0400*** 0.0371*** 
 
        
 (0.00287) (0.00288) (0.00380) 
Constant 7.759*** 7.514*** 7.218*** 5.292*** 4.923*** 4.543*** 9.300*** 9.134*** 9.234*** 8.471*** 8.265*** 8.520*** 
 (0.168) (0.203) (0.300) (0.233) (0.273) (0.401) (0.195) (0.239) (0.349) (0.192) (0.248) (0.349) 
             
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 649 649 344 325 325 166 324 324 178 308 308 164 
Pseudo R2 0.0256 0.0261 0.0270 0.0467 0.0491 0.0562 0.00150 0.00221 0.00214 0.0192 0.0197 0.0223 
30 
 








































Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Social signaler (Barnstars) = 1 if the subject decided to 
advertise at least one of his Barnstars on his user page (0 otherwise). Social signaler (user page) = 1 if the subject has a Wikipedia user page whose size (in bytes) is greater than the median in the sample of all 
non admin and all admin subjects, respectively. Reciprocity – Public Goods = average proportion of endowment conditionally contributed in the Public Goods game strategy method; Reciprocity – Trust = 
average proportion of amount received that is returned by the subject in the Trust game strategy method. nb Barnstars = total number of Barnstars received by each subject. Models (1) to (6) are all admin 
subjects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
number of Wikipedia contributions 
Admins Admins Admins Admins Admins Admins 
       
Social signaler (user page) 0.354*** 0.601* 0.364 
    (0.135) (0.324) (0.485) 
   Social signaler (Barnstars) 
   
-0.0202 -0.245 0.0149 
 
   
(0.160) (0.296) (0.464) 
Reciprocity – Public Goods x Social signaler (user page) 
 
-0.854** 
     
 
(0.389) 
    Reciprocity – Public Goods x non Social signaler (user page) 
 
-0.370 
     
 
(0.441) 
    Reciprocity – Trust x Social signaler (user page ) 
  
-1.070** 
    
  
(0.546) 
   Reciprocity – Trust x non Social signaler (user page) 
  
-0.686 
    
  
(0.788) 
   Reciprocity – Public Goods x Social signaler (Barnstars) 
    
-1.041*** 
  
    
(0.328) 
 Reciprocity – Public Goods x non Social signaler (Barnstars) 
    
-1.293*** 
  
    
(0.461) 
 Reciprocity – Trust x Social signaler (Barnstars) 
     
-0.981** 
 
     
(0.458) 
Reciprocity – Trust x non Social signaler (Barnstars) 
     
-0.159 
 
     
(0.978) 
nb Barnstars 
   
0.0167*** 0.0195*** 0.0339*** 
 
   
(0.00371) (0.00342) (0.00716) 
Constant 10.24*** 10.55*** 10.05*** 10.31*** 10.35*** 10.77*** 
 (0.321) (0.329) (0.596) (0.299) (0.340) (0.654) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 102 102 49 113 113 57 





Table A.1. Association between number of Wikipedia contributions and  

















Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Reciprocity – Public Goods = average proportion of endowment conditionally contributed in the Public 
Goods game strategy method; Altruism – Dictator = proportion of endowment transferred in the Dictator game. Altruism – 
Dictator in-group = proportion of endowment transferred in the directed Dictator game. Models (1) and (2) are all non admin 
subjects; models (3) and (4) are non admin subjects below the median number of Wikipedia contributions (i.e. 1905 
contributions); models (5) and (6) are non admin subjects above the median number of Wikipedia contributions; models (7) 


















Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Send – Trust = proportion of endowment 
sent in the Trust game. Model (1) is all non admin subjects; model (2) is non admin subjects below 
the median number of Wikipedia contributions (i.e. 1905 contributions); model (3) is non admin 
subjects above the median number of Wikipedia contributions; model (4) is all admin subjects.
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: 

















                
Reciprocity – Public Goods 0.181 0.193 0.681* 0.700* -0.00265 0.0889 -1.382*** -1.418*** 
 
(0.261) (0.264) (0.394) (0.396) (0.300) (0.309) (0.424) (0.430) 











(0.253)  (0.305) 










(0.349)  (0.260) 
 
(0.343) 
Constant 8.197*** 8.254*** 5.735*** 5.822*** 9.176*** 9.236*** 10.34*** 10.32*** 
 
(0.264) (0.268) (0.410) (0.416) (0.290) (0.285) (0.294) (0.297) 
     
  
  Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 305 305 159 159 146 146 56 56 
Pseudo R2 0.00707 0.00708 0.00983 0.00988 0.00226 0.00259 0.0187 0.0189 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 








     Send - Trust 0.0780 -0.0265 -0.0393 -0.730** 
 
(0.180) (0.272) (0.187) (0.309) 
Constant 8.185*** 5.859*** 9.198*** 10.52*** 
 
(0.274) (0.426) (0.287) (0.319) 
     Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 305 159 146 56 
Pseudo R2 0.00687 0.00819 0.00191 0.0150 
